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Abstract Competences over environmental matters are
distributed across agencies at different scales on a national-
to-local continuum. This article adopts a transaction costs
economics perspective in order to explore the question
whether, in the light of a particular problem, the scale at
which a certain competence is attributed can be reconsid-
ered. Speciﬁcally, it tests whether a presumption of least-
cost operation concerning an agency at a given scale can
hold. By doing so, it investigates whether the rescaling of
certain tasks, aiming at solving a scale-related problem, is
likely to produce an increase in costs for day-to-day agency
operations as compared to the status quo. The article
explores such a perspective for the case of Venice Lagoon.
The negative aspects of the present arrangement concern-
ing ﬁshery management and morphological remediation
are directly linked to the scale of the agencies involved.
The analysis suggests that scales have been chosen cor-
rectly, at least from the point of view of the costs incurred
to the agencies involved. Consequently, a rescaling of
those agencies does not represent a viable option.
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Introduction
Competences over environmental matters are distributed
across agencies ranging from the national to local level:
There are ﬁsheries to be preserved, migratory bird species
to be monitored, habitats to be maintained, national parks
to be managed, and each of those activities can be entrusted
to national ministries or agencies, local municipalities, or
to some intermediate bodies on a regional level. The choice
of the speciﬁc level at which to allocate a certain compe-
tence, regardless of its actual rationale, has implications for
the relation between the agency’s territorial jurisdiction
and the scale of the activities that the speciﬁc competence
foresees.
Scholars have advanced several claims concerning that
relationship: Young (2002) identiﬁes a ‘‘problem of ﬁt’’
that emerges when politico-administrative jurisdictions,
often historically grown and representing political or cul-
tural divisions do not match with the physical reality and
hence the scale of what they manage. According to Adler
(2005), this is often the case in environmental politics,
leading to serious implementation deﬁcits and less effec-
tive environmental protection measures. As a consequence,
administrative reforms often aim at improving the match
between regulatory and ecological scale although this
might be at the expense of interplay between authorities
operating at an ecosystem level and those operating within
traditional jurisdictions (Moss 2003, 2004). The European
Union’s Water Framework Directive (Directive 2000/60/
EC) constitutes an example of a similar reform: It requires
Member States to restructure their management activities
on a river basin level (Art. 3). By establishing river basin
districts as central administrative units, the directive
attempts to match the level of water governance with the
physical scale of the watershed resource to be managed.
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scholars and the European regulators agree on the general
desirability of such a match, we intend to introduce the
element of costs in the overall discussion on rescaling. In
doing so, we will build upon the perspective proposed by
Birner and Wittmer (2004) based on transaction costs
economics and focusing on the effects of decentralization
and devolution on the costs of running governance struc-
tures in natural resource management. The idea is that,
along with Olson (1969), rescaling efforts might indeed
close gaps in the relationship between agencies (including
their tax base) and the scale of the resources they manage
(including their respective beneﬁciaries). What is new,
however, is that this may simultaneously increase the
monetary and non-monetary costs those very agencies face
in going about their daily business. To the extent that more
costly day-to-day operations reduce effectiveness in envi-
ronmental management, this may potentially more than
offset the advantages sought after while rescaling. A closer
look is in order.
This article will explore whether rescaling is likely to
produce an increase in governance costs as compared to the
status quo. If that is the case, rescaling does not represent a
‘‘solution’’ but a ‘‘shifting’’ of the problem. An undesirable
‘‘mismatch’’ may have been eliminated via rescaling,
though at the cost of greater efforts in running the newly
established governance system. In order to explore this
possibility, we turn to the case of Venice Lagoon. A scale
mismatch between the arrangements regulating ﬁshery
management and morphological remediation proves prob-
lematic namely in light of the Polluter Pays Principle
endorsed by the Water Framework Directive. A rescaling of
either arrangement may be necessary. We can, however,
show that the present arrangements are likely to represent a
least-cost option precisely in the light of their scale, so that
rescaling is likely to produce more costly governance
arrangements. We hence conclude that, among the policy
options available to the Italian decision-makers, governance
arrangements shall ﬁrst be considered which address the
present mismatch without involving rescaling. Extending a
similar perspective beyond the Venice case, we show here
how an analysis of governance cost can help screening
scale-related policy options in environmental matters.
The article is organized as follows: In the next section,
we will present our theoretical framework combining Ol-
son’s theory of ﬁscal equivalence (1969) with Birner and
Wittmer’s (2004) work on governance costs and with
recent accounts on multi-level governance as put forward
by Hooghe and Marks (2003). We will then present the
case of Venice Lagoon and the challenges it creates. The
last section is dedicated to our conclusions and discusses
avenues for further research.
Costs and Scale in Governance Arrangements:
Insights from the Literature
Olson’s theory of ﬁscal equivalence (1969) constitutes the
conceptual starting point of this article. The basic argument
is that, every time a good is provided where its contributors
differ partly or fully from its users, incentives arise for the
provision of the good to be resized accordingly. Despite the
broader applicability of the concept, the goods that Olson
has in mind are those services provided by public author-
ities for the general public—hence things enjoyed by many
and contributed to by many (the taxpayers), deprived
however of the one-to-one relationship between demand
(beneﬁciaries) and offer (contributors) otherwise typical in
market situations. Textbook examples are public radio
stations, or national defense, though the outcomes of the
operations of an environmental agency are by no means
different. In that case, Olson’s rescaling would happen
in situations where a national environmental authority, paid
for by national taxpayers, enacts a certain policy which
happens to beneﬁt only a smaller, localized fraction of the
population. According to Olson, nobody wants to pay for a
service he or she does not enjoy. Incentives arise for con-
tributors to make use of the appropriate representation
channels (e.g. voting) so that the speciﬁc competence is
assigned to an agency whose jurisdiction (and tax base)
encompasses those particular beneﬁciaries and no one else.
The principle of ﬁscal equivalence is generally looked at
as a normative standard for agency design: It tells us how
agencies should be designed. Olson himself suggests,
however, that the same principle could, to some extent,
explain the duplication of agencies in the U.S. adminis-
tration of the 1960s, when the article was written (Olson
1969, p. 487). The principle may, therefore, bear positive
explanatory power by laying the foundation on how
agencies have been and will be designed. If the principle
holds true, we can expect to observe a match of agency
jurisdictions, contributors and beneﬁciaries.
Olson himself is cautious concerning the explanatory
power of his concept, and introduces a limiting factor.
Speciﬁcally, he stresses that the complexity of public
policy makes a perfect match of jurisdictions, contributions
and beneﬁciaries impossible. This limits the degree to
which ﬁscal equivalence can be obtained. Intuitively,
equivalence comes at a cost for the regulators and that
additional cost may be high enough to make a certain
degree of disequivalence acceptable (see pp. 485–486).
The message we take is hence twofold: First, we can expect
a tendency in agency design towards the matching descri-
bed above. Second, the same tendency will at a certain
point stop as an effect of the aforementioned additional
cost.
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123Olson is certainly not alone in trying to explain the
distribution of competencies across multiple, hierarchically
organized policy levels. In particular the notion of multi-
level governance has gained popularity after alternative,
non-hierarchical modes of governance had been identiﬁed
(Jordan 2001; Papadopoulos 2005). Such arrangements are
less in line with the classic federalist notion of what has
later been labeled Type I multi-level governance.
According to Marks and Hooghe (2004) who have pop-
ularized this dichotomy, Type I governance arrangements
are characterized by a limited number of jurisdictions with a
distinct, mutually exclusive territorial basis and a long
record of competencies for a variety of policy problems.
Being incorporated into a hierarchically structured political
system, they are characterized by a clear attribution to a
constituency through established representation channels:
Classical federalist polities are prime examples for this
‘Russian doll-like’ organization of political power.
Its conceptual counterpart, Type II multi-level gover-
nance, often depicted as a ‘marble cake’, is characterized
by entities spanning vertically across levels of political and
administrative organization as well as horizontally
throughout the public–private divide. Marks and Hooghe
(2004) draw a picture of ﬂexible regulatory bodies, often
established for a limited time only and serving a single,
speciﬁed purpose. The design of these agencies, particu-
larly concerning the choice of jurisdiction borders and the
related attribution of competencies, does not reﬂect repre-
sentation considerations (e.g. clear attribution to a con-
stituency, explicit link to representation channels) as is the
case for Type I agencies. Instead, their design adapts and
shows ﬂexibility in order to adequately deal with speciﬁc
tasks, even to the extent of competing with, or duplicating
already existing Type I entities. The authors locate Type II
forms of multi-level governance in public–private part-
nerships, fora of transnational cooperation, but also par-
ticipatory forms of decision making across several policy
levels (Marks and Hooghe 2004).
We can now establish a link with Olson’s perspective:
Fiscal equivalence may explain the distribution of com-
petencies among Type I agencies embedded in a hierar-
chical system. When, instead, Type II arrangements occur,
the matching of jurisdictions, contributors and beneﬁciaries
is far more difﬁcult to establish in comparison to their Type
I counterparts. What is more, such identity may possibly
come about, but it cannot do so through the mechanism
suggested by Olson. This is precisely because of the looser
representation proﬁle Type II arrangements involve. Fur-
thermore, the Type I vs. Type II dichotomy is presented in
terms of arrangements with a strong representation proﬁle
(Type I) as opposed to arrangements with a task-oriented,
ﬁt-for-purpose rationale (Type II). This suggests a trade-off
between the two dimensions. Take as a reference a certain
agency design with a speciﬁc representation proﬁle and a
corresponding degree of effectiveness in performing a
certain task. It is then possible to consider alternative
designs that show a weaker representation proﬁle and a
higher degree of effectiveness for the same type of activity.
Let us now introduce a broad and heterogeneous set of
tasks and speciﬁc effectiveness targets for all of them. We
can then imagine tasks being compatible with a high degree
of representation in agency design as well as tasks where
the necessary degree of effectiveness is achieved at the cost
of a lower degree of representation.
The last considerations make it necessary to further
characterize the agencies at hand in relation to the tasks
they are set to fulﬁll. Skelcher (2005, pp. 97–99) helps us
here. Building on Marks and Hooghe, he provides a more
thorough exploration of Type II multi-level governance
forms and distinguishes between ‘‘clubs’’, ‘‘polity-forming
bodies’’ and ‘‘agencies’’ (relabeled here ‘special agencies’
in order to avoid confusion with Type I entities). Special
agencies are the most relevant for the purpose of this article
as they represent bureaucratic organizations which were
established to fulﬁll a speciﬁc task under the political
supervision of the central government. Breaking political
levels, sectors and territories, their mission is to deliver
effective and efﬁcient policies through ﬂexible manage-
ment outside the boundaries of the pre-existing adminis-
trative hierarchy.
Although Skelcher (2005) does not discuss the sources
of his typology very extensively, the differences in roles
that state agencies are assigned to in Type II settings is
striking. While agencies do not play a vital role at all in
‘‘clubs’’, they engage in a communicative and, sometimes,
power-sharing relationship with non-state actors in ‘‘polity-
forming bodies’’. In the third typology, public ofﬁcials
appear in special agencies without direct interaction with
stakeholders. This would seem to discourage any attempts
to characterize Marks and Hooghe’s Type II multi-level
settings in relation to agency operations. However, Skel-
cher’s taxonomy allows us to concentrate on the special
agency interpretation. We can therefore distinguish Type I
from Type II settings in terms of particular tasks being
provided by agencies placed within the existing hierarchies
(Type I), or by special agencies placed outside them (Type
II). This speciﬁcation allows us to treat the two typologies
of governance arrangements in organizational terms,
focusing on alternative agency designs and exploring them
along the dimension of costs.
Within the scholarly work on the drivers behind new
modes of governance political economists have explored
an economic rationale for organizing politics, be it within,
or beyond traditional hierarchies (Williamson 1999; Paa-
vola and others 2009). Birner and Wittmer (2004), in
particular, explore the ‘‘efﬁcient boundary of the state’’ (p.
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sible trade-offs between representation on the one hand and
least-cost service provision on the other. By doing so, they
rely on the legacy of transaction costs economics (see
Williamson 2000 for an overview of the ﬁeld).
Transaction costs economics traditionally addresses
questions of make-or-buy in a context of industrial orga-
nization. Unit of analysis is the dimension of contracting
and the cost-saving possibilities offered by a hierarchical
support to otherwise ‘‘unassisted’’ market transactions
(Williamson 1985). While this approach has been trans-
lated to public choice questions (Williamson 1999), the
contribution by Birner and Wittmer is among the ﬁrst
attempts to bring it close to environmental matters. The
make-or-buy question originally addressed by Williamson
(1985) becomes thereby a question of decentralization and
devolution, while the organizational dimension of the
management activities at stake is explicitly spelled out with
reference to the speciﬁcities of environmental matters.
In their proposal, Birner and Wittmer present a partic-
ular cost taxonomy against which they assess the com-
parative efﬁciency of different management options for
protected areas (pure central state management, hybrid
state-business management and hybrid state-community
co-management). The core of their approach lies in the idea
that the elements of such cost taxonomy behave differently
for the different governance forms considered. That hap-
pens as a function of conceptual dimensions such as ‘‘care
intensity’’, ‘‘threat to resource’’ and ‘‘measurement costs’’.
Such dimensions have their foundation in Williamson’s
discriminating alignment hypothesis, distinguishing ‘‘asset
speciﬁcity’’, ‘‘uncertainty’’ and ‘‘frequency’’ (Williamson
1985). Hagedorn (2008, p. 372) instead suggests ‘‘modu-
larity and decomposability of structures’’ and ‘‘functional
interdependence of processes’’ as units of characterization.
He stresses that natural processes require a different
treatment than the industrial ones described by Williamson.
Entering the debate on the superiority of either approach
requires a thorough exploration of the concept of transac-
tion. For the sake of simplicity, we will show that the
superiority of the one or the other arrangement emerges
from a characterization of the speciﬁc task under scrutiny
from an organizational point of view.
Transactions are not to be mistaken for transitions, and
therefore we are not dealing with the costs of shifting from
one governance arrangement to another. Rather we are
interested in the day-to-day costs of running a certain
governance arrangement. Our interest is based on a simple
reasoning: if ﬁnancial budgets or other types of capacities
are limited and constant, increases in the day-to-day costs
of running a certain arrangement are bound to decrease its
effectiveness. Different governance arrangements imply
different organizational setups, whose costs are different on
a daily basis. This may affect their effectiveness regardless
of any considerations of one-off costs incurred because of
the transition. The classiﬁcation derived by Birner and
Wittmer refers to this typology of running costs. They
speciﬁcally distinguish between production costs and
governance costs, the latter encompassing the costs of
decision making as well as the costs of implementing a
speciﬁc policy. In economic jargon, production costs refer
to the costs of realizing the core product of a speciﬁed
activity. Decision-making costs, instead, represent those
costs attributed to processes necessary for the core product,
e.g. a policy, and its characteristics to be identiﬁed against
a palette of alternatives. Finally, implementation costs
encompass those costs connected with ensuring and
enabling the achievement of a certain objective.
Birner and Wittmer (2004) further subdivide both deci-
sion-making and implementation costs into direct and fail-
ure costs—isolating with the latter the sub-optimality
generated by decision-making and implementation failure,
respectively. The sum of decision-failure and implementa-
tion-failure costs is thereby seen as deviation from a welfare
curve (p. 670), i.e., from socially optimal outcomes. We
depart from this view as we interpret the emphasis on failure
in terms of the high degree of uncertainty surrounding
environmental matters. When outcomes are systematically
different thanexpectedtoadegreewhere expectationscease
to be meaningful, policies are never actually effective
because desired outcomes are systematically never
achieved. Attention must be paid to those resources a gov-
ernance arrangement sets aside for dealing with such devi-
ations. If we, however, distinguish risk and uncertainty from
ignorance in decision-making (Faber and others 1992), we
notice that a decision process can intentionally allocate
resources to the ﬁrst two only. Risk namely corresponds to a
set of expected outcomes coupled with probability distri-
butions. Concerning uncertainty, expectations towards
alternative outcomes are still there, but probability distri-
butions cease to be meaningful. Ignorance corresponds
instead to the absence of expectations towards what may
happen next. Whatever loss may emerge from ignorance
will do so beyond expectations. The related costs cannot
have meaningfully shapeda speciﬁc choice, as that choice is
bound to be prior to their discovery. Here, we are interested
in those costs that affect choices: Ignorance-related failure
costs are therefore out of scope.
Furthermore, we consider failure costs merely related to
risk and uncertainty as implicit in production and imple-
mentation costs. To the extent production and implemen-
tation follow from a particular decision-making process,
the expectations held will simply translate into speciﬁc
characteristics of the good produced, of the broader mon-
itoring of it and of the further decision-making expected.
This corresponds to projected production, implementation
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123and decision-making costs. We have no compelling reason
to further tell them apart and remain with a cost taxonomy
based on decision-making costs (DM), production costs
(P), and implementation costs (I). If we then consider the
costs captured by these three categories as a function of the
arrangement chosen for a certain task (the production of
good X) a certain arrangement A is more cost-effective
than an alternative arrangement B if:
DM A;X ðÞ þ P A;X ðÞ þ I A;X ðÞ \DM B;X ðÞ þ P B;X ðÞ
þ I B;X ðÞ : ð1Þ
At this point, a link must be established with the scale
dimension of the arrangement. Birner and Wittmer do so by
comparing alternative governance arrangements intrin-
sically nested at speciﬁc levels. Similarly, we refer to the
Type I vs. Type II dichotomy. This has implications for the
way the scale variable is treated. A purely federalism
orientedapproachwouldmakeitoperationalasadiscrete,or
continuous variable ranging between ‘national’ and ‘local’.
A multi-level governance perspective as understood here
would, instead, rest on a dichotomization between agencies
being embedded in pre-existing, multi-tiered, hierarchical
politico-administrative structures, or being constituted ad
hoc. Cost reasoning would then attach to decision-making,
production and implementation costs for the embedded
agency being higher or lower than decision-making,
production and implementation costs for the ad-hoc
alternative.
An example may help clarify this. Assume a hierarchical
politico-administrative system encompassing four levels
L1, L2, L3 and L4 (from the highest to the lowest). Then
assume a certain agency, providing through its operations a
good X. In federalism terms, the most basic question would
be at what level to nest the agency providing X (see Benson
and Jordan in this issue). This means ﬁnding out whether
the difference between the beneﬁt of X provided at level L
and the sum of DM(L;X), P(L;X) and I(L;X) is biggest for
L = L1, L2, L3 or L4. Obviously, expressing both the
beneﬁt of X and the costs related to its provision as a
function of the level of provision translates into different
arrangements foreseeing one central agency providing X
uniformly at L1 as opposed to several low-level agencies
providing X locally at L4, or to intermediate options for L2
and L3. Differences in the cost functions may then emerge
basically in the presence of economies of scale (explained
below) and of a degree of spatial variation of preferences
across territorial units (Marks and Hooghe 2000). Within
such framework, the principle of ﬁscal equivalence, as laid
out above, would take the spatial extent of X for given and
claim that L will tend towards it.
When contrasting the set-up of Type I and Type II
arrangements, the question is a different one: Is X provided
at the lowest cost through an agency embedded in the
politico-administrative structures encompassed by the L1-
to-L4 hierarchy, or should it be provided by an agency
outside it? Rationale behind such thought is that the space
between L1 and L4 may be conceptualized as a continuum
in physical terms, but it is certainly not so in terms of pre-
existing politico-administrative structures. Here environ-
mental matters make a difference: If the good at stake is
not a purely industrial commodity and has, instead, a sig-
niﬁcant link to ecological dimensions, its territorial extent
is likely to fall somewhere in between, say, L2 and L3. The
size of a forest, for example, may exceed the size of a
jurisdiction at L3 level without necessarily being as big as
L2. This would mean that the management of that forest
(the good X) involves at least two but not all jurisdictions
at L3. If that is the case, L2 is oversized for providing X: In
federalism terms, it would have more contributors than
beneﬁciaries. L3, however, is undersized: Only the L3
jurisdictions covered by the forest (let us ﬁrst assume
uniformly) will be involved matching beneﬁciaries and
contributors. Though the forest is one, thus the two juris-
dictions will have to coordinate action. This is costly and
may be likely to duplicate efforts. If we then release the
uniformity assumption so that only part of the respective
two jurisdictions host the forest mentioned above, the
coordination efforts will grow as the management of the
forest involves a number of L4 jurisdictions crossing an L3
boundary. If we consider that the interconnectedness of
ecosystem features makes it likely for the provision of X to
have plural consequences at different scales, we will see
that the costs of coordination across jurisdictions necessary
for (the beneﬁt of) matching beneﬁciaries and contributors
is likely to become prohibitive. Let us however assume
that, within the pre-existing tiers, it is possible to identify a
level that strikes the best compromise. Reasons remain for
one to wonder whether maybe:
DM ‘‘AdHoc’’;X ðÞ þ P ‘‘AdHoc’’;X ðÞ
þ I ‘‘AdHoc’’;X ðÞ \DM ‘‘Embedded’’;X ðÞ
þ P ‘‘Embedded’’;X ðÞ þ I ‘‘Embedded’’;X ðÞ ð 2Þ
where DM(‘‘AdHoc’’;X) expresses the decision-making
costs for an agency created ad-hoc for the provision of the
good X, while DM(‘‘Embedded’’;X) expresses the deci-
sion-making costs for an agency producing the same good
X from within pre-existing hierarchical administrative
structures. Similarly for the other cost categories.
The link with Marks and Hooghe’s Type I vs. Type II
dichotomy is clear. Yet there is more because the charac-
terization behind their dichotomy relies on a second
dimension: The single-task vs. multiple-task character of
an agency. The link to costs seems straightforward in that a
multiple-task agency has opportunities for economies of
Environmental Management (2010) 46:17–28 21
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however, a hidden and counter-intuitive implication: The
choice of level has moved away from economies of scale to
economies of scope.
Economies of scale are those cost savings that one
achieves by spreading ﬁxed costs over a high number of
production units. A simpliﬁed example could be that the
same police department would prove less costly (per
intervention) if operating at L3, intervening almost every
day, than if operating at L4 and intervening, say, once or
twice a month. Economies of scope, instead, refer to the
savings obtained by bundling different activities together.
It may be, for example, less costly to entrust the afore-
mentioned police department with the additional task of
trafﬁc oversight compared to having a dedicated corps for
that. Such consideration depends little on how much trafﬁc
oversight is needed and more with the two activities
(crime-related police operations and trafﬁc oversight)
having compatible, or even synergetic characteristics.
The federalism question posed above reﬂects a trade-off
between the spatial variation of preferences and the econo-
miesofscalethatcanbeachievedviacentralization.Interms
of multi-level governance, the trade-off is instead between
the costs of an ad-hoc constituted, dedicated special agency
and the economies of scope that can be reaped by bundling
the same activity within the appropriate tiers of pre-existing
bureaucraticstructures.Thismeansthatwhenaddressingthe
‘‘embedded’’ vs. ‘‘ad-hoc’’ question as in (2), the relevant
economies of scale as in (1) have been reaped already.
We can now put the above idea in analytical terms: In
light of the Type I vs. Type II dichotomy presented by
Marks and Hooghe, with an eye on Skelcher’s interpreta-
tion of special agencies in Type II settings, we can char-
acterize agencies along two dimensions, as shown in
Table 1: Agencies being single-purpose vs. multi-purpose
entities and agencies nested in pre-existing administrative
hierarchies vs. agencies created ad-hoc. Four logical ideal-
types emerge; two of them, though, can be dismissed. An
ad-hoc, multi-purpose agency is logically inconsistent:
Nothing can be ‘‘ad-hoc’’ for a multitude of things (e.g.,
tasks) at the same time. Instead an embedded, single-pur-
pose agency can be dismissed under the assumption that its
embeddedness forces a degree of integration and task-
sharing with the rest of the administrative structure, vio-
lating the single-purpose character. What remains are the
two categories by Marks and Hooghe/Skelcher.
Having produced a cost taxonomy along Birner and
Wittmer (2004) and having characterized Type I and Type II
governance arrangements in terms of agency embeddedness
and single-purpose vs. multi-purpose connotation, we now
have to explore the link between the two to structure expec-
tations towards the superiority of either approach. In order to
do that, a characterization of the task at hand is necessary. At
this point, matters of space forbid us to proceed fully
deductively, providing a catalogue of all operations envi-
ronmental agencies do and classifying them along a set of
dimensionsleadingtospeciﬁccostfactors.Wethereforehave
tonarrowthefocusoftheanalysis.Wewilldosobyreferring
to the Venice case focusing only on those speciﬁc activities
undertaken by the environmental agencies involved.
Fishery Versus Remediation in Venice Lagoon
Located in north-eastern Italy, Venice Lagoon encom-
passes several protected areas which survive on a delicate
balance between conditions of sedimentation and erosion.
Both anthropogenic and natural factors have severely
compromised such balance so that the lagoon in its present
conﬁguration relies to a large extent on human interven-
tion. The city of Venice, built in the middle of the lagoon,
is ﬂood prone. Increasing erosion and rising sea level
threaten the survival of the habitats of the lagoon hosts.
This translates into the need to constantly intervene in the
lagoon’s morphology, reshaping its bottom in order to
counterbalance erosion, which also preserves Venice from
ﬂooding and the habitats from disappearing. Erosion is
inevitable to the extent it comes from natural phenomena
and/or phenomena that are an exception (e.g. sea level
rise). If it is caused by speciﬁc human activities instead, the
question arises whether their regulation is appropriate.
In the context of this article, two activities are key: On
the one hand, the remediation activities dealing with the
lagoon’s morphology; on the other hand, the commercial
clam ﬁsheries. Two goods are most directly at stake: The
good ‘‘morphological remediation’’ (R) and the good
‘‘clam ﬁshery produce’’ (F), qR/qF expressing their rela-
tionship. The provision of both goods is seen as a function
of their regulatory setting. Along with Ostrom (1990), this
moves the analysis from matters of operational choice
(how much R, F given qR/qF) to questions of collective
choice (how rules on operational choice are decided upon;
how qR/qF is thereby accounted for) and constitutional
choice (how rules on collective choice are produced). We
then express the latter two in scale terms as derived above.
From the 1990s, commercial clam ﬁshing has had a
signiﬁcant socio-economic importance in Venice Lagoon
(Granzotto and others 2001, Longo and Rosato 2004). It
has, however, detrimental effects on the lagoon morphology
Table 1 Ideal-typical agencies in Marks and Hooghe’s character-
ization
Embedded Ad-Hoc
Single purpose agency – Type II
Multiple purpose agency Type I –
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trawlers carrying suction-dredging devices. The interven-
tions necessary to restore the morphological damages it
causes generate monetary costs estimated at 50% of the
sales revenues (Granzotto and others 2001, p. 51), raising
the question about the sector’s proﬁtability. That question
becomes indeed compelling as soon as reference is made to
the scale dimension of the arrangements involved.
The harvesting of the clam resource is subject to a
licensing system run by the Province of Venice, which will
be referred to as ‘‘the Province’’ from here on. The licensing
scheme was introduced to avoid the likely depletion of the
resource under open access.The licensingsystem represents
only an intermediate step towards the ofﬁcially endorsed
goal of establishing an aquaculture regime. A system of
aquaculture is indeed considered superior in both economic
and ecological terms. Instead, the morphological remedia-
tion activities are undertaken by a public–private entity
encompassingtheVeniceWaterAuthority(‘‘Magistratoalle
Acque di Venezia’’) and CVN (‘‘Consorzio Venezia Nu-
ova’’), a consortium of middle-sized and large Italian com-
panies operating on coastal and infrastructural engineering
projectsandrealizingsimilarinterventionsinthelagoonasa
single concessionaire under exclusivity terms. The inte-
grated organizational structure resulting from their combi-
nation, from here on referred to as MAV/CVN, is nested at a
nationallevelwhileitoperateswithinthelagoononly.Thisis
exceptional. Within Italy’s four-tiered politico-administra-
tive set-up (encompassing national, regional, provincial and
communal levels), such matters usually belong to regional
administrations. The regions then have the possibility of a
downstreamdelegationtowardstheprovincesastheydo,for
example, in the case of the ﬁshery regime.
What results from a similar arrangement are the
following:
• The Province entitles the ﬁshery sector to a certain
level of operation, producing private revenues and
employment circumscribed to its territory.
• The sector is simultaneously allowed to produce a
certain degree of nuisance through the morphological
damages connected with its operations.
• Recovering such damages is not a function of the
administration of the Province, but of MAV/CVN,
producing costs.
• Being such costs born by MAV/CVN, they are born at
national level and not at provincial level.
• This results in a transfer of wealth from national, public
pockets to provincial, private ones.
• The present situation is therefore not compatible with
the Polluter Pays Principle endorsed by the Water
Framework Directive.
The different levels, at which the agencies are nested are
at the core of the wealth transfer identiﬁed above. In our
interpretation, Olson would forecast a rescaling of the
agencies involved here to internalize the transfer of wealth
unless prohibitively complex: speciﬁcally, remediation
activities at province level or Fishery Management at
national level. The re-scaling did not happen, nor did an
environmentally superior technological ﬁx (aquaculture),
which is available. Hence, there must be something about
this arrangement that explains its persistence. This must be
so despite the very same arrangement being ofﬁcially
considered sub-optimal, as implicit in its connotation of
transitory phase towards aquaculture.
Explaining the persistence of the current arrangement
is certainly a complex endeavor, exceeding the scope of
this article. However, there is a scale-related aspect we
will concentrate on, which is in line with the theoretical
exploration above: The question, namely, whether a
rescaling of the agencies involved would solve the
problem, or whether it would shift it. Speciﬁcally, would
a rescaling, aimed at internalizing the abovementioned
transfer of wealth, simultaneously lead to costlier agency
operations? We believe so. In particular, we argue that,
despite the wealth transfer, the speciﬁc choice of level for
both agencies is likely to produce least-cost arrangements
for the tasks the agencies are entrusted with. We will
substantiate this argument in the next section.
Agency Design and the Costs of Fishery
Management and Morphological Remediation
The ideal types developed by Marks and Hooghe/Skelcher
constitute a good approximation of the arrangements con-
cerning ﬁshery management and morphological remedia-
tion in Venice Lagoon. With reference to the multi-purpose
vs. single-purpose character of an agency as well as to its
position within vs. outside established administrative tiers,
we are able to recognize a Type I setting for what concerns
ﬁshery management, while remediation resembles a Type
II arrangement. Revolving around the operations of the
Province’s administrative branch, ﬁshery management is
ﬁrmly embedded in the regular four-tiered, hierarchical
administrative structure. Such organization is multi-pur-
pose by nature, dealing with the environment as well as
with education, tourism, welfare, cultural promotion and so
on. MAV/CVN, instead, was created with one purpose in
mind: Remediation of Venice Lagoon. It works beyond
existing administrative units and jurisdictional boundaries,
focusing on a comparatively narrow and specialized set of
tasks.
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and how can we characterize them in relation to decision-
making, production and implementation costs? The Prov-
ince is a full-ﬂedged politico-administrative jurisdiction in
that it has elected representatives producing regulations
and an administrative body executing them. Concerning
ﬁshery policy and the licensing system in particular, the
local parliament issues regulations specifying quotas, per-
mitted techniques and ﬁshing areas, while the administra-
tive branch has the task of materially issuing the licenses.
Monitoring the ﬁshermen’s compliance to ﬁshery regula-
tions constitutes a police matter. It is not the responsibility
of the Province but of the local territorial subdivision of the
Guardia di Finanza, a special police corps relating to the
national Ministry of Finance.
In comparison, MAV/CVN, is entrusted with remedia-
tion works in the lagoon. Such works encompass medium
and large-scale infrastructural projects, which, in the light
of the lagoon’s unique conﬁguration, require innovation
and research as well as a high degree of specialization.
Moreover, dealing with ﬂood protection, MAV/CVN is
required to act swiftly and effectively for the preservation
of assets of national interest and ultimately for the safe-
guarding of a world heritage. This translates into a con-
tinuous process of information gathering concerning the
state and the evolution of the lagoon. This is coupled with
the development and tailoring of technical solutions for
speciﬁc problems which subsequently need to be decided
upon, put in place and monitored in their realization.
The next step in our analysis consists in linking the
above activities to decision-making, production and
implementation costs. Considering ﬁshery management,
production costs refer to the process of issuing licenses,
while decision-making costs are incurred in deﬁnition of a
ﬁshery policy for the lagoon. Finally, implementation costs
are mainly the result of ﬁshery monitoring activities,
issuing ﬁnes and prosecuting transgressors. On the mor-
phological remediation side, decision-making costs refer to
the development and selection of alternative technical
solutions mitigating, or adapting to those phenomena
causing the disappearing of particular morphological fea-
tures of the lagoon. Production costs refer to the physical
realization of such technical solutions, while implementa-
tion costs refer to supervising their realization in compli-
ance to the planning.
Having established a link, however simplistic, between
the tasks and the cost taxonomy derived above, the question
we intend to address is whether scale-related variations
are likely to increase costs. As highlighted above, the scale
questionisnotunderstoodhere interms ofthe level atwhich
it is best to embed a certain agency. Instead, it is a matter of
whether it is best to attribute a certain task to a multi-
purpose agency embedded in pre-existing, multiple-tiered
politico-administrative hierarchies as opposed to constitut-
ing ad-hoc single-task, special agencies outside them. This
is equal to the question whether a Type I setting would
represent a least cost option, or whether a Type II arrange-
ment would do so instead.
Analytically,we can formulatethe followinghypotheses:
DM ‘‘Type2’’;F ðÞ þ P ‘‘Type2’’;F ðÞ þ I ‘‘Type2’’;F ðÞ
[DM ‘‘Type1’’;F ðÞ þ P ‘‘Type1’’;F ðÞ þ I ‘‘Type1’’;F ðÞ ;
ð3Þ
while
DM ‘‘Type2’’;R ðÞ þ P ‘‘Type2’’;R ðÞ þ I ‘‘Type2’’;R ðÞ
\DM ‘‘Type1’’;R ðÞ þ P ‘‘Type1’’;R ðÞ þ I ‘‘Type1’’;R ðÞ :
ð4Þ
where F and R refer to ﬁshery management and to
morphological remediation, respectively. For the reader’s
convenience, we re-labeled Type I and Type II settings
using Arabic numerals in the formulas. With an eye on
possible incommensurability issues in adding up the
different elements above, we restricted our analysis to
questions of dominance. Speciﬁcally, the condition in (3) is
certainly respected if DM(‘‘Type2’’;F)[DM(‘‘Type1’’;F),
P(‘‘Type2’’;F) [P(‘‘Type1’’;F) and I(‘‘Type2’’;F)[
I(‘‘Type1’’;F) at the same time, regardless of the possi-
bility to conﬂate them into a single dimension (similarly for
(4)). The six, pair-wise comparisons obtained are dealt with
singularly in the following. The general terms of the
analytical approach used are depicted in Fig. 1: For a
general task, sub-activities (intuitively: preference uptake,
production, veriﬁcation etc.) take place that are affected by
certain organizational dimensions (coordination across
layers, possibilities for economies of scope, spatial vari-
ation of relevant preferences, degree of specialization etc.).
Suchdimensionsplayoutdifferentlyaccordingtothetypeof
arrangement chosen, and therefore lead to different costs.
DM ‘‘Type2’’;F ðÞ [DM ‘‘Type1’’;F ðÞ
Intuitively, deﬁning clam harvesting areas, quotas and
techniques has to be done harmoniously across the lagoon.
The territorial extent of the Province matches almost
perfectly that of the lagoon. This implies that performing
this task through agencies at lower levels such as
municipalities, each one covering only a fraction of the
lagoon, would require costly coordination efforts. Instead,
regulating ﬁsheries at a higher level through a regional
agency for ﬁshery management would require it to be able
to differentiate between inland ﬁsheries and lagoon
ﬁsheries. A similar setup would de facto resemble an
agency at provincial level, but would miss out on
possibilities to channel the preferences of the lagoon’s
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123dwellers, implying higher decision-making costs. In this
sense, the identity of scale between the Province and
Venice Lagoon is a convincing reason to assign lagoon
ﬁshery management tasks to the Province.
This shows that DM(‘‘Type2’’;F) is arguably minimal
for the Province compared to other levels. We need this to
show that a special agency ad-hoc would not be able to
perform the same at lower decision-making costs. As
above, a similar agency, operating at a provincial level, but
detached from the Province would need to set up channels
for preference uptake from scratch. This corresponds to
higher decision-making costs compared to the Province
which has them already in place. Hence, the only way for
such costs to be comparatively lower is to allow the agency
to operate independently of the constituency’s preferences.
To the extent the Region, currently delegating to the
Province, would still be responsible for ﬁshery manage-
ment and simply act through a special agency, its decision-
making costs do not change. These costs are likely to be
higher than those of the Province and have to be added to
those internal to the ad-hoc agency and to those coming
from the mutual coordination. We may thus expect
DM(‘‘Type2’’;F)[DM(‘‘Type1’’;F) in the sum.
P ‘‘Type2’’;F ðÞ [P ‘‘Type1’’;F ðÞ
Plausibly, production costs are likely to be lower for the
Province than for an ad-hoc structure performing the same
task. In this, both the multi-purpose and the embedded
character of the Province play a role. First, the bureaucratic
apparatus of the Province is easily able to reap economies
of scope by dealing with a number of different issues.
Setting up a bureaucracy from scratch and running the
licensing system would arguably be more costly.
Furthermore, the embeddedness of the Province may
allow it to capitalize on the structures of other tiers
above or below at a comparatively lower cost than its ad-
hoc counterpart. Ideally, there may be economies of scope
in bundling bureaucratic tasks connected with the licensing
system to other activities the Province does in cooperation
with e.g. the Municipalities. In comparison, an ad-hoc
agency possibly relying on municipal structures to issue the
licenses (e.g. giving ﬁshermen the possibility to hand in
documents at the closest municipality, rather than at the
agency’s own facilities) will need to set this up and run it
independently. The Province may have a number of similar
initiatives, possibly making them less costly on an
individual basis. In terms of productions costs, the
Province seems superior to a special agency for the task
of running the licensing system. We may thus expect
P(‘‘Type2’’;F)[P(‘‘Type1’’;F).
I ‘‘Type2’’;F ðÞ [I ‘‘Type1’’;F ðÞ
As far as implementation is concerned, monitoring and
enforcing the clam ﬁshery regime is a competence of police
authorities. Prima facie, there is no reason to assume that the
costsofpoliceoperationsinensuringcompliancetoacertain
policy depend on the design of the agency that has produced
the policy at stake. Speciﬁcally, it seems safe to assume that
police operations ensure a homogeneous compliance to a
numberofTypeIandTypeIIarrangementsatthesametime.
Nonetheless, it is worthy to explore a possible feedback
mechanism from the decision-making process. If DM
(‘‘Type2’’;F)[DM(‘‘Type1’’;F), a higher number of
policy cycles may be necessary for a certain arrangement
to be established. In particular, it is plausible that a higher
number of adjustments be necessary. If, by chance, non-
compliance to the ﬁshery regulations by the ﬁshermen is
correlated to the amount of time the arrangement requires
Fig. 1 Agency design and
transaction costs
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I(‘‘Type2’’;F)[I(‘‘Type1’’;F). Most importantly, the
possible feedback on decision-making costs suggests that
implementation costs may be relevant for a cost-driven
agency design choice even if they do not fall directly on the
agency itself.
DM ‘‘Type2’’;R ðÞ \DM ‘‘Type1’’;R ðÞ
As an agency operating outside established politico-
administrative structures, decision-making costs internal to
theMAV/CVNcanbeexpectedtobecomparativelylow.As
stated above, we expectthis toholdtrue onlyifthe agencyis
not required to uptake preferences. This raises the question
of which preferences enter into how the agency operates.
MAV/CVN operates within the boundaries of the Province.
It deals with safeguarding a site of national interest, so that
therelevantsetofpreferencesideallyspansacrossthewhole
nation. We are dealing with a multi-tiered decision process
involvingactorsallalongtheimplementationchainfromthe
national to the communal level. Within the regular
hierarchical structure, similar processes require a degree
of coordination on substantive issues, increasing expenses
for staff and organization as well as taking more time.
Instead, the preference uptake process pre-ordered to the
operations of MAV/CVN represents the shortest decision
chain possible by collapsing national, regional and
provincial decision-making into two dedicated and slightly
differently focused coordination fora: The Safeguard
Commission and the Committee for Coordination and
Control. The ‘‘remaining’’ decision-making is considered
technical in nature and delegated to MAV/CVN. We may
thus expect DM(‘‘Type2’’;R)\DM(‘‘Type1’’;R).
P ‘‘Type2’’;R ðÞ \P ‘‘Type1’’;R ðÞ
MAV/CVN represents a single-purpose agency. Production
costs are likely to be high in light of the missing synergies
with other tasks. Nonetheless, given the high degree of
specialization required, economies of scope seem to be
unlikely. The activities performed through MAV/CVN can
be reasonably thought of as so different from the
administrative business-as-usual that little can be saved by
bundling them with other tasks. No savings or synergies can
be reaped within a multi-purpose agency as in a Type I
setting. A single-purpose special agency as in Type II
arrangementsseemstobethemostcost-effectiveoption.For
this typology of activity, one may expect P ‘‘Type2’’;R ðÞ
\P ‘‘Type1’’;R ðÞ :
I ‘‘Type2’’;R ðÞ \I ‘‘Type1’’;R ðÞ
Both the jurisdiction of the Province and the territorial
extent of MAV/CVN operations match the ecological
boundaries of the lagoon. If remediation was a competence
bestprovidedatprovinciallevel,theprima-facieexpectation
would be that implementation costs are equal for the two
arrangements. We know, however, that remediation is a
national matter, so that the relevant question is whether a
national,multi-purposeagencyintegratedoverfourtierscan
perform veriﬁcation activities in a less costly manner than a
dedicated one. Intuitively, we would say it can’t. The reason
forthisistherequiredcoordinationstretchingacrossthreeof
the four tiers. Certainly, the hypothetical national agency
will have ramiﬁcations at the Province level that could take
on the remediation-related veriﬁcation activities and report
back to the national level. Nonetheless, the remediation
activities in Venice Lagoon can be reasonably thought of as
sufﬁciently exceptional and that a similar agency would not
be able to bundle the related veriﬁcation with those it does
otherwise. To the extent that agency would need to put
dedicated efforts into monitoring the remediation activities,
its cost are likely to resemble those of an ad-hoc, Type II
special agency. Such costs, however, would be augmented
bytheadditionalcoordinationwiththeothertiers.Inthesum,
we can expect I(‘‘Type2’’;R)\I(‘‘Type1’’;R).
The above seems to suggest that both agencies represent
least-cost options for the tasks they are set to fulﬁll. While
the choice of a nested, multi-purpose agency seems
appropriate cost-wise for the ﬁshery regime, a single-pur-
pose agency with a jurisdiction based on ecological
grounds seems best suited for the remediation regime.
Although the multi-level governance setting around Venice
Lagoon organizes the competent authorities for ﬁsheries
and remediation in very different ways, their respective
structures seem to provide for least-cost operations. This
suggests that (1) The Province may indeed be the least-cost
level at which to run the licensing system, which is best run
from within the pre-existing politico-administrative struc-
tures. It also suggests that (2) Remediation is possibly best
dealt with at national level through an ad-hoc agency
relying on a coordination forum, at least as far as costs are
concerned. Moving away from the present arrangements is
likely to inﬂate costs. The analysis seems to conﬁrm the
presumption of efﬁciency concerning the two distinct
arrangements. If this is the case, any attempt at solving the
currently problematic relationship between remediation
and clam ﬁshery by introducing changes in the Type I/Type
II proﬁle of the arrangements at stake will come at a cost:
That of having agencies which operate at comparatively
higher costs for what concerns decision-making, produc-
tion and implementation.
Conclusion
This article has conceptually linked scale issues in envi-
ronmental matters to the dimension of costs in agency
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123design. It has subsequently approached a speciﬁc problem
affecting the present arrangement in Venice Lagoon. The
analysis is led in scale terms, proxied via the Type I vs.
Type II dichotomy as proposed by Hooghe and Marks
(2003), and suggests that the present arrangement may
represent a least-cost option for the tasks considered. We
may conclude that scale-related solutions to the problem at
hand (the apparent, scale-dependent incompatibility with
the Polluter Pays Principle) are likely to undermine the
advantage of the present arrangement in terms of least-cost
operations for the agencies involved. In this ﬁnal section,
we intend to discuss the robustness of this analysis, the
implications of its ﬁndings for the problem in Venice, and
possible pathways for future research.
Concerning robustness, it is important to keep the
exploratory character of the present article in mind. Our
analysis suggests that, concerning costs, Type II arrange-
ments may have an edge over their Type I counterparts for
certain tasks, while this may not be the case for other tasks.
This is intuitive, shifting the question to the conditions
under which one type is preferable to the other. Such
conditions have been explored by characterizing the tasks
at hand in their organizational and fundamentally bureau-
cratic dimension with an eye both on the agency charac-
terization suggested by Hooghe and Marks (2003) and on
the cost taxonomy we derived from Birner and Wittmer
(2004). As little or no information is available concerning
the administrative side of the Venice context, the two
aspects have been linked resting on plausibility reasoning
only and thus with an openly speculative approach.
In the absence of data, we have embarked on a thought
experiment: The insights produced as a result may now
justify efforts in terms of further research and empirical
validation. Similar efforts would certainly need to target
the actual organizational setup of the two agencies as well
as the involved bureaucrats’ perceptions concerning the
likely dynamics of the cost factors. While the analysis here
rests on hypothetical potentials for economies of scope,
particular attention shall be given to the actual possibilities
for such savings. Only then will it be possible to conﬁrm
the pair-wise comparisons at the end of the previous sec-
tion. If, however, that could be granted, what implications
would our ﬁndings have for Venice Lagoon as well as for
settings presenting the same conditions?
We have found out that the current overall arrangement
is likely to ensure least-cost operations in morphological
remediation and in ﬁshery management. This is so even in
spite of allowing for a transfer of wealth and holding onto it
regardless of the availability of a superior alternative. The
transfer of wealth is not compatible with the Polluter Pays
Principle endorsed by the European Water Framework
Directive. Thus, there is a chance that an alternative
arrangement becomes mandatory where a sector (and a
level) is not able to rely on wealth transfers from another
one. Our analysis suggests that if such an alternative is
sought after via a rescaling of the present overall
arrangements (e.g. remediation led by the Province in a
Type I setting; ﬁshery management by MAV/CVN in a
Type II arrangement), it will come at higher decision-
making, production and implementation costs. If that is the
case, internalizing the problem through a better ‘‘ﬁt’’ would
not solve it but shift it instead. A different interplay
between the two agencies must be sought after supporting
the idea of a trade-off between ﬁt and interplay as in Moss
(2003, 2004).
While this study has demonstrated the value of com-
bining multi-level governance and economic analysis, a
number of research questions remain to be explored in
more detail. On one hand, there is an obvious research gap
with regard to assessing the governance costs of different
institutional arrangements beyond the two scenarios ana-
lyzed in this article. Such an analysis would, for example,
include forms of self-governance, or participatory decision
making (also see Newig and Fritsch 2009). On the other
hand, further research is needed to explore the mutual
relationships of Type I and Type II governance arrange-
ments when they coincide in time and place. In his valuable
work, Skelcher (2005) proposed four ideal types of how
these two modes of governance could relate to each other
(parallel, complementary, incorporated and oppositional).
A more thorough theoretical conceptualization as well as
empirical analysis is needed.
With reference to the Venice case, further research
seems worthwhile concerning the actual coordination
mechanisms between the two sectors. As the present study
has cautioned against rescaling solutions, the interest goes
now to analyzing the problem as a product of the motiva-
tion the different decision-makers hold, focusing on how
new coordination mechanisms could instead create incen-
tives towards a different overall arrangement without a re-
designing of the agencies involved. In particular, we see a
promising extension of the present inquiry in testing
whether the persistence of the current arrangements can be
understood in terms of symbolic policy (Blu ¨hdorn 2007). If
it were possible to show that the present situation (wealth
transfer included) is actually beneﬁcial to the decision-
makers on both the ﬁshery and the remediation side, the
national taxpayer would remain alone in experiencing a net
loss from the current arrangement. In that case, new
interplay mechanisms would need to involve, or at least be
transparent towards the national taxpayer in order to make
any difference.
Finally, the present article shows a possibility for
screening scale-related policy options along with the cost
proﬁle of the governance arrangements involved. The rel-
evance of this approach goes beyond the Venice case.
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of governance, we have been able to test, albeit specula-
tively, the presumption of efﬁciency (via least-cost opera-
tion) of the present arrangements against their scale
dimension. A similar endeavor can be undertaken when-
ever rescaling seems to constitute a policy option for a
certain issue to be addressed. By testing the presumption of
efﬁciency of a given arrangement against scale, it is pos-
sible to determine whether the arrangement happens to be
in a situation of least-cost service provision, or whether
there may be possibilities for additional cost reductions via
rescaling. In the ﬁrst case, one would need to either balance
off the beneﬁts of the planned rescaling with the increase in
costs it implies, or search for options that do not involve
rescaling. In the second case, the direction of the rescaling
compared to the cost reductions would determine whether
there is a double dividend (cost reductions plus beneﬁts of
rescaling), or whether the rescaling would worsen an
already suboptimal situation.
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